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1. Introduction 
  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  analyze  and  reveal  the  interrelation  and  the 
distinct characteristics between culture and  corruption. Cultural values guide and 
shape the way the function of social institution (Licht et al. 2007). Barr and Serra 
(2010) suggest that social norms cannot be affected only by values and beliefs but by 
“the proportion of people who adhere to the norm, which in turn affects individuals’ 
beliefs in the values underlying the norm, and, as a consequence, the likelihood that 
the norm  will be internalized by others including future generations”. This social 
mechanism  explains  the  existence  of  “culture  of  corruption”  indicating  that 
individuals who grow up in societies in which corruption is prevalent will be more 
likely to accept corruption and act corruptly, in contrast with those who grow up in 
a more transparent society (Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002). According to Attila (2009) 
few  studies  have  examined  the  relation  between  countries  social  factors  and 
corruption  levels.  This  research  argues  the  existence  of  distinct  cultural 
characteristics  which  explain  countries’  corruption  levels  (among  other  factors), 
which can be revealed through nonparametric techniques
1.      
2. Methodology and data 
Let  the  sample  realizations  ( , ) i i Y X are  i.i.d.  defined  on.  Then  the 
nonparametric regression model has the form of: 
   ( ) , 1,..., . i i i Y g X u i n                (1). 
The  functional  form  of   () g   is  a  smooth  function  and  can  be  estimated 
nonparametrically  using  kernel  methods.  Following  Li  and  Racine  (2007) 
 ( ) ( ) g x E Y x is  a  function  ofx .  Then  by  denoting  the  joint  probability  density 
function (PDF) as  , ( , ) y x f x y the marginal PDF of X  as ( ) f x and the conditional PDF 
of Y X  as  , ( ) y x f y x
2then: 
 , ( , ) ( , )/ ( ) y x y x f x y f x y f x               (2). 
Then Li and Racine (2007, p.59-60) have proved that: 
       
, ( , )




yf x y dy
E Y X x yf y x dy g x
f x
        (3),      
then the  , ( , ) y x yf x y dy  can be estimated as by replacing the unknown PDF  , ( , ) y x f x y  
with its kernel estimated as 

 , ( , ) y x y f x y dy  where 


     
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          (4). 
                                                 
1 Nonparametric techniques have been used by many studies  on different context due to the fact that 
the fact that they relax the parametric assumptions imposed on the data generating process and let 
the data determine an appropriate model (Racine 2008, p.2) 
2 Also called a “stochastic kernel” (Stockey et al. 1989). 
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                   (5). 
Where  K   is  a  second  order  Gaussian  kernel  and  his  the  appropriate  bandwidth 
which will be analyzed next. Equation (5) is the “local constant” kernel estimator or 
the “Nadaraya-Watson” kernel estimator introduced by Nadaraya (1965) and Watson 
(1964).  
The  most  popular  data  driven  methods  for  bandwidth  selection  are  least-
squares cross-validation and the AIC based method
3 of Hurvich et al. (1998), which 
is based on minimizing a modified Akaike Information Criterion (Racine 2008).  In 
this case the Hurvich et al. approach has been applied
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                (7) 
with

( ) i g X being a nonparametric estimator and H being n n  weighting function with 
its ( , )th i j element given by 
     

      
1
, , , 1 1 / , /
q n
ij h ij h il h ij s is js s l s H K K K h k X X h              (8). 
  According to Li and Racine (2007) there is a within sample measure goodness 
of fit analogue  to  the one of 
2
R parametric regression models. Let  i Y  denote  the 
outcome and 

i Y the fitted values for observationi , then the 
2
R for the nonparametric 
regression can be defined as: 
                                                 
3 Also plug-in methods such as that by Sheather and Jones (1991) are very popular but according to 
Loader (1999) they have found to be tuned by arbitrary specification of pilot estimators and are prone 
to over-smoothing when presented with difficult smoothing problems. 
4 According to Hal et al. (2004) least-squares cross-validation (and the AICc) automatically determines 
which  components  of  X  are  relevant  to  the  problem  of  conditional  inference and which  are not, 
through assigning large smoothing parameters to the latter and consequently shrinking them toward 
the uniform distribution on the respective marginals. This effectively removes irrelevant components 
from contention, by suppressing their contribution to estimator variance (Racine 2008, p.25). 
5 Li and Racine (2004) have proved that AICc tends to perform better than the least square cross-
validation method for small samples (as in this case), while for large samples there is no significant 
difference between the two. 





                 
         











i i i i
Y y Y y
R
Y y Y y
                  (9). 
Then a consistent significance test for continuous regressors defined by Racine (1997) 
is  applied  in  order  to  verify  the  significance  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  the 
depended.  Letz   denote  the  explanatory  variable(s)  that  might  be  redundant,  let 
X denote  the  remaining  explanatory  variable(s)  in  the  regression  model,  and  let 
Y denote the dependent variable. 
Then the null hypothesis can be written as (Racine 2008, p. 67): 
 








: ( ) 0
E y x z
H x
x
 almost everywhere. Then the test statistic is an estimator 
of: 
   
2 ( ) I E x
6. 
  The paper uses a sample of 77 countries
7 with the variable of interest being 
the average value (of 1996-2006) of corruption perception index (CPI)
8 provided by 
Transparency  International.    The  explanatory  variables  used  in  order  to  measure 
countries’  national  culture  are  derived  from  the  four  cultural  dimensions  as 
introduced  by  Hofstede  (1980)
9:  power  distance  (PDI);  individualism  versus 
                                                 
6  A  test  statistic  can  be  obtained  by  forming  a  sample  average  of  I ,  replacing  the  unknown 
derivatives with their nonparametric estimates   

i X  as described in Racine (1997): where    

i X  is 
the local  constant  partial derivative estimator described previously.  Then   0 n I   in probability 
under  0 H   and    0 0 n I in  probability  under 1 H .  Then  the  null  distribution  of  this  statistic  is 
obtained by applying bootstrap procedures. 
 
7  Argentina,  Australia,  Austria,  Bangladesh,  Belgium,  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Canada,  Chile,  China, 
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Czech  Rep,  Denmark,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Salvador,  Estonia,  Ethiopia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Islamic Rep, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya,  Luxembourg,  Malaysia,  Malta,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Niger, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian, Saudi Arabia, 
Sierra  Leone,  Singapore,  Slovakia,  South  Africa,  Spain,  Suriname,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Taiwan, 
Tanzania,  Thailand,  Turkey,  United  Arab  Emirates,  United  Kingdom,  United  States  of  America, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. 
8 Many studies (Gokcekus and Knörich 2006; Gokcekus 2008; Gundlach and Paldam 2009; Saha et al. 
2009; Naved and Ali 2010) have used CPI as a proxy of corruption with a scale from 0 (perceived to 
be  highly  corrupt)  to  10  (perceived  to  have  low  levels  of  corruption).  For  details  see: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb 
9 For an extensive analysis of Hofstede’s cultural indexes see Halkos and Tzeremes (2011). For details 
see: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/. 
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collectivism (IDV); masculinity versus femininity (MAS); and uncertainty avoidance 
(UAI)
10. 
3. Empirical analysis 
Table 1 presents the results from the local constant relation with average CPI 
value as dependent variable and the four cultural values as independent (the full 
model).  The  results  indicate  a  goodness  of  fit  of  80.6%  (R
2=0.8059)  and  the 
nonparametric  significant  test  (Racine  1997)  reveals  that  the  four  explanatory 
variables are statistically significant at 10% level (p-value= 0.097744). However, the 
individual influence of every explanatory variable needs to be assed; therefore four 
additional nonparametric regressions have been applied.  
 
Table 1:  The results of the nonparametric regressions 







PDI  8.0323  0.6013  0.075188*** 
IDV  9.7042  0.5555  0.015038** 
MAS  9.5203  0.2356  0.035088** 
UAI  21.1777  0.0683  0.072682*** 
Full model     0.8059  0.097744*** 
*Significant at 1% level.       
**Significant at 5% level.       
***Significant at 10% level.         
 
Sub-figures 1a, 1c, 1e and 1g illustrate graphically the conditional densities 
(stochastic kernels) from the four cultural values. In addition the sub-figures 1b, 1d, 
1f  and  1h  represent  the  local  linear  nonparametric  regression  plots  with  their 
bootstrapped pointwise error bounds
11. For the case of PDI (sub figures 1a and 1b) 
the stochastic kernel reveals that the probability mass lies on high PDI values and 
lower CPI values. In addition we observe that the probability mass lies also at lower 
PDI and higher CPI values. Moreover the nonparametric regression line indicates a 
negative relation between the PDI and CPI with a goodness of fit of 60% with the 
                                                 
10 Power distance: ‘‘the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations 
within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally’’ (p. 28). Individualism versus 
collectivism: ranges from ‘‘societies in which the ties between individuals are loose’’ to ‘‘societies in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups’’ (p. 51). Masculinity 
versus femininity: ranges from ‘‘societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct’’ to ‘‘societies 
in  which  social  gender  roles  overlap’’  (p.  82).  Uncertainty  avoidance:  ‘‘the  extent  to  which  the 
members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations’’ (p. 113). 
11 According to Racine (2008, p.44) the asymptotic formula performs better only on small  h values 
therefore bootstrapped variability bounds are often preferable to those obtained via the asymptotic 
approximations. 
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PDI being statistical significant at 10% level (Table 1). The main characteristic of 
societies with higher power distance is the tolerance of rigid social hierarchies with 
clear and distinct separations between socioeconomic classes. In addition high power 
distance societies are bureaucratic based societies with distinctive hierarchical roles 
of individuals. Getz and Volkema (2001) suggest that high power distance cultures 
tend to be more corrupted based on two factors. First, underclass members of such a 
society try to improve their position through the extortion for bribes and therefore 
corruption is perceived as a ‘vehicle’ for higher position within the society raising in 
such a way their living standards (Abueva 1970). Secondly, all the benefits that can 
be  gained  from  corruption  are  regarded  from  higher  officials  as  ‘natural-logical’ 
privileges gained from their official positions. Furthermore, due to the likelihood that 
officials demand or accept bribes leads to the phenomenon where businesses will offer 
or pay bribes. For the case of IDV (1c and 1d) the nonparametric regression reveals 
a positive relationship with a goodness of fit of 55% and the IDV variable being 
statistical significant at 5% level. The stochastic kernel reveals that probability mass 
lies  at  higher  IDV  and  CPI  values,  but  also  at  lower  IDV  and  CPI  values. 
Individualistic societies are based on the fact that individual is more valuable than 
the  group.  In  contrast  collectivism  society  values  the  social  group  over  the 
individual.  It  is  believed  that  collectivism  is  linked  with  lower  ethical  standards 
(Husted 1999), whereas individualism  with  higher (Amstrong 1996). According  to 
Getz and Volkema (2001) collectivism cultures may contain networks of friends and 
family  creating  relationships  which  can  facilitate  abnormal  or  illegal  transactions. 
Therefore  it  is  expected  that  higher  corruption  levels  are  integrated  to  higher 
collectivism societies. Furthermore, the case of MAS (1e and 1f) the results indicate 
a “U” shape relationship with a goodness of fit of 23% and the MAS variable being 
statistical  significant  at  10%  level.  The  stochastic  kernel  reveals  that  probability 
mass lies at higher MAS and lower CPI values, but also at lower MAS and high CPI 
values. According to Getz and Volkema (2001) in masculine cultures people may be 
comfortable pursuing their goals through bribes provided they view the probability 
of success as high. Furthermore, the nonparametric analysis between UAI and CPI 
(1g and 1h) reveals a negative relationship with relationship with a goodness of fit of 
6% and the UAI variable being statistical significant at 10% level. The stochastic 
kernel reveals that the probability mass lies at lower UAI and higher CPI values, but 
also  at  higher  UAI  and  lower  CPI  values.  In  societies  with  high  uncertainty 
avoidance individuals perceive that is necessary to work through informal channels 
in  order  to  achieve  their  personal  objectives  and  thus  to  minimize  uncertainty. 
Similarly the officials accept and demand those bribes and illegal channels. Since the 
corruption  patterns  are  established  breaking  out  of  them  would  create  further 
uncertainty (Getz and Volkema 2001). 
Finally, looking the R
2 values of the four variables (Table 1) it appears that 
only PDI and IDV values in a society have a dominant role determining countries’ 
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Figure  1:  Nonparametric  conditional  PDF  figures  and  local  constant  estimators 
using the AICc bandwidth selection and a second order Gaussian kernel throughout. 
 
1a   1b   
1c   1d  
1e   1f  
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1g   1h  
4. Conclusions 
The  nonparametric  analysis  reveals  the  fact  that  culture  and  corruption  are 
interrelated.  The  highly  corrupted  countries  have  strong  and  distinct  cultural 
characteristics.  These  are  high  power  distance  and  lower  individualistic  values. 
According to Hofstede (1980, 2002) values are acquired in childhood and therefore, 
national cultures are remarkably stable over time. In addition cultural characteristics 
of countries would probably change at extremely slower rate compared to countries’ 
corruption  perception  index.  Therefore  since  governments  cannot  easily  change 
cultural characteristics (and their influence on how societies perceive corruption), the 
only way which corruption can be controlled is through good governance. According 
to  Kaufmann  (2005,  2008)  good  governance  is  a  direction  of  traditions  and 
institutions  towards  common  good.  It  implies  the  process  of  the  effective 
management  of  resources  by  governments  and  the  implementation  of  policies 
through  the  adjustment  and  the  introduction  of  institutions  which  permit  and 
promote private and public sector development. 
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